

RELEASED IN PART
NR, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

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PAGE 01 STATE 132313 312243Z
ORIGIN AF-01

INFO	LOG-00	AID-00	AMAD-01	CIAE-00	SMEC-00	OASY-00	DODE-00
	EUR-01	H-01	TEDE-00	INR-00	IO-08	L-01	ADS-00
	M-00	NSAE-00	NSCE-00	OIC-02	OIG-04	OMB-01	PA-01
	PM-00	PRS-01	P-01	SP-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	T-00
	USIE-00	PMB-00	PRMC-01	DRL-09	G-00	/033R	

DRAFTED BY: AF/C:KAISTON:KCA

APPROVED BY: AF:GMOOSE

AF/C:ARENTER

AF/C:RFENDRICK

AF/E:DDUNN

EUR/UBI:EBROCKING

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P R 312243Z MAY 95

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY KIGALI PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY

INFO RWANDA COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T STATE 132313

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, BE, US, BY, RW, CG

SUBJECT: AMB. ADAM REVIEWS CENTRAL AFRICA WITH A/S MOOSE

1. CLASSIFICATION - AS MARKED.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 132313 312243Z

2. (S) SUMMARY. ON MAY 26, BELGIAN AMB. ADAM CALLED ON

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AF A/S MOOSE TO REVIEW RWANDA, BURUNDI, AND (VERY BRIEFLY) ZAIRE. ADAM OUTLINED BELGIAN VIEWS ON UNAMIR, WHICH LARGELY PARALLELED U.S. VIEWS, ALTHOUGH BELGIUM FAVORED HAVING UNAMIR RETAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROTECTING CIVILIAN POPULATIONS.

1.4(B), 1.4(D)

HE REPORTED THAT BELGIUM WOULD LIKE THE UN TO ESTABLISH A COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ARMS FLOWS INTO EASTERN ZAIRE. A/S MOOSE SAID WE ARE STILL AWAITING RESULTS OF PROMISED UN CONSULTATIONS WITH THE OAU AND NEIGHBORS ON THIS ISSUE. ON BURUNDI, ADAM AND A/S MOOSE DISCUSSED POSSIBLE FORMS THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY MIGHT TAKE.

THE TWO DISCUSSED THE DIFFICULT PROBLEM OF CHINESE ARMS, WHICH A/S MOOSE NOTED WAS CAUSING AN ACUTE PROBLEM

FOR PRESIDENT NTIBANTUNGANYA. ADAM WONDERED WHETHER SOME COMPROMISE MIGHT BE STRUCK, SUCH AS BLOCKING ONLY THE EXCEPTIONAL OR UNNECESSARY ITEMS OF WEAPONRY, WHILE A/S MOOSE STRESSED THE NEED TO CONVINCE THE MILITARY NOT TO BLAME THE PRESIDENT IN THE EVENT OF A NEGATIVE RESULT.
END SUMMARY

RWANDA

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 132313 312243Z
UNAMIR

3. (C) ADAM SAID BELGIUM'S POSITION WAS THAT UNAMIR NEEDED TO STAY IN RWANDA, DESPITE GOR MISGIVINGS, BECAUSE IT PLAYED AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN CONTRIBUTING TO CONFIDENCE AND MONITORING HUMAN RIGHTS. THE GOB THOUGHT UNAMIR SHOULD HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT CIVILIAN POPULATIONS, ESCORT RETURNING IDP'S AND REFUGEES, AND PROTECT UN IN-COUNTRY OPERATIONS AND PERSONNEL. ADAM SAID

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THE BELGIANS DID NOT THINK THAT UNAMIR SHOULD ASSIST WITH RECONSTRUCTION, TAKE ON SECURITY IN THE CAMPS OUTSIDE RWANDA, OR POLICE THE BORDER, ALTHOUGH OBSERVERS TO MONITOR THE BORDER MIGHT BE ACCEPTABLE.

4. (C) A/S MOOSE SAID OUR VIEWS WERE GENERALLY IN AGREEMENT BUT THAT WE BELIEVE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS AT RISK SHOULD BE DE-EMPHASIZED SINCE THAT RESPONSIBILITY IS TOO DIFFICULT TO FULFILL, AS THE KIBEHO INCIDENT DEMONSTRATED. WE DO, HOWEVER, WANT A UNAMIR PRESENCE THAT CAN MONITOR SECURITY CONDITIONS AND THEREBY PROVIDE CONFIDENCE AMONG THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. WE AGREED THAT UNAMIR SHOULD NOT BE INVOLVED IN RECONSTRUCTION AND HAD NOT PROPOSED THAT IT HAVE A BORDER MONITORING RESPONSIBILITY.

5. (C) A/S MOOSE OUTLINED OTHER AREAS WHERE WE SEE A UNAMIR ROLE, INCLUDING PROTECTION FOR TRIBUNAL PERSONNEL AND HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS, TRAINING OF CIVILIAN POLICE, ASSISTANCE IN DEMINING, AND SUPPORT FOR THE SRSG'S GOOD OFFICES EFFORTS. ADAM REPLIED THAT HE WAS SURE HIS

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 132313 312243Z
GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE NO PROBLEM WITH THESE OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE MANDATE.

CAMP/BORDER SECURITY

6. (C) IN REPLY TO A QUESTION FROM BELGIAN POLCOUNS VERBEKE, A/S MOOSE SAID WE HAD DECIDED AGAINST PROPOSING EXTENSION OF UNAMIR BEYOND RWANDA'S BORDERS AS WE WERE LARGELY SATISFIED WITH THE RESULTS OF THE UNHCR SECURITY FORCE IN ZAIRE. HOWEVER, WE WERE LOOKING AT RELOCATION OF SOME CAMPS TO HELP REDUCE THE SECURITY PROBLEMS IN THE BORDER AREA. VERBEKE NOTED THAT THE BELGIANS HAD NOT FAVORED MOVING THE CAMPS AWAY FROM THE BORDER BECAUSE THEY FEARED THIS WOULD MAKE IT HARDER FOR REFUGEES TO RETURN. A/S MOOSE REPLIED THAT AS MORE TIME PASSES, THE LIKELIHOOD OF NEAR-TERM REPATRIATION BECOMES MORE AND MORE REMOTE.

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THE CAMPS ON THE BORDER ARE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THE PROBLEM OF BORDER INSECURITY; RELOCATING THE CAMPS COULD ADDRESS THAT PROBLEM AND MAY BE LESS EXPENSIVE THAN WE HAD INITIALLY THOUGHT.

1.4(B), 1.4(D)

8. (C) A/S MOOSE REPLIED THAT THE MESSAGE HE HAD RECEIVED DURING HIS LAST TRIP TO RWANDA WAS QUITE CLEAR: THE GOR VIEWS THE ACTIVITY ON ITS BORDERS AS A SERIOUS THREAT; THEY LOOK TO THEIR NEIGHBORS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, BUT IF WE AND THE NEIGHBORS ARE UNSUCCESSFUL, THE GOR WILL FEEL OBLIGATED TO DO WHAT IT MUST TO PROTECT ITSELF. HOWEVER, THE KIBEHO INCIDENT MAY MAKE THEM MORE CAUTIOUS, AS THEY HAVE LEARNED THE LIMITATIONS OF THEIR CAPABILITIES AND CAN EXPECT A REACTION FROM THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

9. (C) A/S MOOSE SAID WE HAD NOT SEEN ANYTHING INDICATING UGANDA WOULD PARTICIPATE IN A PREEMPTIVE RWANDAN ATTACK ON THE CAMPS. HE NOTED THAT MUSEVENI HAS PROBLEMS OF HIS OWN AND SAID OUR SENSE WAS THAT MUSEVENI WOULD RATHER RESOLVE THE IRRITATION THAN JOINING IN A RWANDAN RESPONSE.

1.4(B), 1.4(D)

A/S MOOSE ADDED THAT HIS VISIT TO THE SUBREGION MADE CLEAR THAT BOTH RWANDANS AND BURUNDIANS

HAVE REAL SUSPICIONS ABOUT MOBUTU, BUT WE DO NOT HAVE EVIDENCE AT THIS POINT THAT THERE IS A SECRET MOBUTU HAND AT WORK.

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ARMS FLOWS

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PAGE 06 STATE 132313 312243Z

10. (C) ADAM SAID THAT THE GOB WANTS THE SYG TO ESTABLISH A COMMISSION OF INQUIRY TO EXAMINE THE REPORTS OF WEAPONS SHIPMENTS INTO CASTERN ZAIRE. DEMARCHES COULD THEN BE MADE BASED ON WHATEVER FINDINGS THERE WERE. A/S MOOSE SAID WE WOULD NOT DISAGREE WITH THAT APPROACH, BUT NE NOTED THAT THE UN HAD ALREADY UNDERTAKEN TO CONSULT WITH THE OAU AND RWANDA'S NEIGHBORS TO SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE. WE ARE WAITING FOR THAT TO HAPPEN. ONE POSSIBLE SOLUTION WOULD BE FOR THE UN/OAU/NEIGHBORS TO AGREE TO DEPLOYMENT OF MONITORS AT GOMA AND BUKAVU AIRPORTS. A/S MOOSE ADDED THAT WE HAVE RAISED THE ARMS REPORTS AND BORDER SECURITY WITH THE ZAIRIAN GOVERNMENT ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS.

11. (C) AF/C DEPUTY DIR. FENDRICK NOTED THAT WE ARE PROPOSING THAT THE UN ARMS EMBARGO ON RWANDA BE CLARIFIED SO THAT IT APPLIES TO RWANDANS IN NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AS WELL AS WITHIN RWANDA. A/S MOOSE ADDED THAT THIS COULD PROVIDE A LEGAL BASIS FOR THE UN TO TAKE ACTION TO INVESTIGATE AND POSSIBLY TAKE FURTHER ACTIONS.

KIBEHO

12. (C) ADAM SAID THE GOB SHARED THE USG'S RELATIVELY POSITIVE VIEW OF THE RESULTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY. THE ONLY THING THE BELGIANS ARE WAITING FOR BEFORE RESUMING NORMAL AID AND COOPERATION IS FOR RWANDA TO BEGIN IMPLEMENTING THE COMMISSION'S

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
UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 132313 312243Z
RECOMMENDATIONS.

BURUNDI

1.4(B), 1.4(D)



COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 132313 312243Z

14. (C) ADAM REPORTED THAT THE BELGIAN PERM REP IN NEW
YORK HAS SUGGESTED THAT, IN LIEU OF A COMMISSION OF
INQUIRY ON BURUNDI, THE UN OPT FOR A "TRUTH COMMISSION"

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ALONG THE LINES OF EL SALVADOR. THIS WOULD ESTABLISH "GLOBAL" RESPONSIBILITY, WHICH MIGHT BE MORE ACCEPTABLE. A/S MOOSE REPLIED THAT THERE IS A DEEP DIVISION OF VIEWS ON THIS ISSUE. WHILE SRSG ABDALLAH AND OTHERS SEEM TO FAVOR A MORE GENERALIZED "TRUTH COMMISSION," THE PRESIDENT AND HIS SUPPORTERS BELIEVE THAT GLOBAL ATTRIBUTION OF GUILT WOULD NOT END THE PROBLEM OF IMPUNITY; THEY PREFER A COMMISSION THAT WOULD LEAD TO PROSECUTIONS OF SOME KIND. THE PRESIDENT TOOK THIS POSITION WHEN HE REQUESTED THE COMMISSION IN HIS LETTER TO THE UN SYG; IF HE LOSES ON THIS ISSUE, HE WILL (ONCE AGAIN) LOOK WEAK TO HIS TUTSI OPPONENTS AND LOSE SUPPORT AMONG HIS HUTU SUPPORTERS.

15. (C) A/S MOOSE SAID OUR OWN INTERNAL DISCUSSIONS INDICATED THAT THIS TYPE OF COMMISSION COULD NOT ACTUALLY TRY CASES OR IMPOSE SENTENCES AND PROBABLY SHOULD NOT DICTATE FOLLOW-ON PROCEDURES. HOWEVER, IT CAN LAY THE FOUNDATION FOR A NATIONAL PROCESS OF SOME KIND. A/S MOOSE STRESSED THE NEED FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE MILITARY AND OTHER ELEMENTS OF SOCIETY AND TO INVOLVE THE MILITARY SO THEY ASSUME SOME RESPONSIBILITY FOR HOLDING THEIR OWN ACCOUNTABLE. HE ADDED THAT THE DISCUSSIONS HE HAD HAD

WITH THE MILITARY ON VARIOUS ISSUES DURING HIS LAST TRIP WAS NOT DIFFICULT; HOWEVER, GETTING THEM TO ACT ON THOSE DISCUSSIONS WAS ANOTHER MATTER.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 09 STATE 132313 312243Z

CHINESE ARMS

1.4(B), 1.4(D)

A/S

MOOSE REPLIED THAT THIS WAS AN ACUTE PROBLEM FOR THE PRESIDENT; HE NOTED THAT NTIBANTUNGANYA HAD MADE A STRONG APPEAL TO THE TANZANIANS TO RELEASE THE ARMS AND THAT BURUNDI MILITARY REPS WERE PRESENT TO WITNESS THE APPEAL. WE UNDERSTOOD THAT MWINYI HAD REPLIED THAT HE'D HAVE TO CONSULT REGIONALLY BUT THAT FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS

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APPARENTLY SAID THE DECISION WOULD NOT CHANGE.

17. (C) ADAM WONDERED WHETHER A DEAL WERE POSSIBLE AND SAID THE BELGIAN EMBASSY HAD SUGGESTED PERHAPS ALLOWING "NORMAL" ITEMS THROUGH BUT BLOCKING "EXCEPTIONAL" WEAPONS. WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING THAT THIS MIGHT BE ONE POSSIBLE WAY OUT, A/S MOOSE SAID WE NEEDED TO CONVINCE THE MILITARY THAT THEY SHOULDN'T BE SURPRISED BY A NEGATIVE RESULT AND THAT, IN ANY CASE, THEY SHOULD NOT BLAME THE PRESIDENT.

ZAIRE

FOIA NR

TALBOTT

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